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I. Introduction
Between social media data scandals in the United States,1
Marriott’s data breach,2 and the alleged election interference by
Russian hackers,3 the international community has been grappling
with how to rein in the “data wild west.”4 India’s Aadhaar system

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law. Managing Editor,
North Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 See generally Social Media Influence: Hearing 115-232 Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Social Media Hearing] (including
representatives from Facebook, Twitter, and Google).
2 See David Volodzko, Marriott Breach Exposes Far More Than Just Data, FORBES
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvolodzko/2018/12/04/marriott-breachexposes-far-more-than-just-data/#1b2afb566297 [https://perma.cc/7PYZ-ZMWR].
3 See Martin Matishak, What We Know About Russia’s Election Hacking, POLITICO
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/18/russia-election-hackingtrump-putin-698087 [https://perma.cc/4V5T-Q57F].
4 We Need to Fix the ‘Data Wild West,’ PRIVACY INT’L (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://privacyinternational.org/feature/2677/we-need-fix-data-wild-west
[https://perma.cc/P6Q9-5H7P].
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exemplifies the dichotomy of wanting to use big data for
convenience and ease, but providing protections on who can use the
data, what data can be shared, and when an individual’s personal
data should be used. This note explores international data privacy
laws in relation to India.
Data privacy varies greatly from country to country, and there
is no one international guideline or way to handle data privacy.
Most countries follow the European Union (“EU”) approach—
increased protections to personal data privacy.5 However, China
does not follow that approach, and instead works to completely
centralize the personal and biometric data of its citizens.6
Specifically, this note examines where India’s Aadhaar system has
placed India on a data privacy spectrum—whether it aligns more
with the EU or China—and how recent proposed legislation affects
the Aadhaar system. I will use the perspective of other countries to
conceptualize where India’s system would fall on this comparative
spectrum of countries’ values of data privacy. This note places
India’s current system on a data privacy spectrum close to that of
Malaysia and China, but by enacting currently proposed legislation,
India would be slowly moving towards the privacy ideals of the EU.
Part II will explain the Aadhaar system, including the Indian
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of
Aadhaar.7 Part III will compare systems along a spectrum of data
privacy values, including those of the EU, United States, Malaysia
and China. Part IV will place India on the data privacy spectrum
and evaluate the effects of proposed legislation8 on individual
privacy rights, including whether the proposed legislation, if
enacted, will curb the negative data privacy implications that
Aadhaar has on society. Part V will conclude by noting unanswered
questions that India will likely have to confront in the near future.

5 See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter
GDPR].
6 See Bernard Marr, Chinese Social Credit Score: Utopian Big Data Bliss or Black
Mirror
on
Steroids?,
FORBES
(Jan.
21,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/01/21/chinese-social-credit-scoreutopian-big-data-bliss-or-black-mirror-on-steroids/#3159395d48b8
[https://perma.cc/25LY-3XXD].
7 See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 3–4 (India).
8
Justice B.N. Srikrishna, A FREE AND FAIR DIGITAL ECONOMY PROTECTING
PRIVACY, EMPOWERING INDIANS (Committee of Experts under the chairmanship of (retd.)
Justice B.N. Srikrishna, 2018).
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II. Aadhaar, An Introduction
Prior to Aadhaar, Manisha Kamble lived as a “street child” in
Mumbai.9 With no birth certificate, no address, and no family she
was “invisible to the state.”10 Manisha was unable to receive
government assistance, unable to go to school, and unable to vote.11
Like Manisha, residents without income, citizenship, or addresses,
and marginalized persons—women, children, senior citizens,
persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and nomads—are
particularly vulnerable because they lack access to government
services.12 Before Aadhaar, millions of citizens were uncounted by
the government, and it proved to be a major hinderance for welfare
programs because of the inability to credibly identify those in need
of welfare.13 Many people received welfare because of fraudulent
or duplicate forms of identification (“ID”) and, alternatively, many
people in need could not receive government benefits because their
IDs were already fraudulently in use.14
In 2006, the concept of Aadhaar was born “to ensure correct
identification of targeted beneficiaries for delivery of various
subsidies, benefits, services, grants, wages and other social benefits
schemes.”15 Aadhaar launched in 2009, and now almost 1.3 billion
people are enrolled.16 It allows a person to enter into transactions
without any ID documents.17 Each person is assigned a unique and
random, twelve-digit identification number and a registration card.18

9 Lauren Frayer & Furkan Latif Khan, India’s Biometric ID System Has Led to
Starvation for Some Poor, Advocates Say, NPR (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/01/652513097/indias-biometric-id-system-has-led-tostarvation-for-some-poor-advocates-say [https://perma.cc/48KX-5GAT].
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See Kamakshi Ayyar, The World’s Largest Biometric Identification System
Survived a Supreme Court Challenge in India, TIME (Sep. 26, 2018),
http://time.com/5388257/india-aadhaar-biometric-identification/ [https://perma.cc/ZNZ5R5KU].
13 See Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 25.
14 See id. at 26.
15 See id. at 25.
16 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY OF INDIA 1 (2019),
https://uidai.gov.in/images/state_wise_aadhaar_saturation_as_on_22052017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5AT-P2UU].
17 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 3.
18 See Ayyar, supra note 12.

622

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

Meanwhile, the government collects and stores demographic (name,
address, phone number, birthday, etc.) and biometric (fingerprint
and iris scans) data.19 The system enables every Indian citizen to be
recognized by their government, regardless of their income,
citizenship, or address.20 Aadhaar is used to open bank accounts,
receive welfare benefits, enroll in school, and more.21 For example,
the individual’s card or identification number is given to a store
employee who runs the card through a credit-card-like-machine.22
The employee authenticates the card using biometrics of either the
fingerprint or iris scan of the cardholder, and the machine tells the
employee how much and for what rations the person is eligible.23
Proponents of Aadhaar advertise the system as fraud proof.24
Opponents to Aadhaar argue that the system puts a person’s
most sensitive data at risk to hackers, and it prevents marginalized
individuals from receiving government assistance because of
administrative problems.25 Specifically, they argue the system is an
Orwellian Nightmare—leading India closer to a totalitarian state,
watched over by “Big Brother,” and further from the data privacy
rights admired in Western democracies.26 Opponents paint a dreary
picture of a system that could coerce an individual “to part with core
information,”27 which the State could use to “profile citizens, track
their movements, assess their habits and silently influence their
behaviour.”28 It “diminishes the status of the citizen” by making
Id.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Jahnavi Sen, In Rural Jharkhand, Aadhaar Link to Welfare Schemes is Excluding
the Most Needy, THE WIRE (Sept. 26, 2018), https://thewire.in/government/jharkhandaadhaar-pds-pensions [https://perma.cc/H348-6QZ7].
23 Id.
24 See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 3–4 (India).
25 Ayyar, supra note 12.
26 See generally Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 53 (noting the benefits of Western
democracies in terms of privacy from the government).
27 Id.
28 Id. In other countries, most notably following Venezuela’s elections, food rations
were conditioned on who the citizens voted for, which the State knew from its
identification system. There is worry in India that Aadhaar may someday be used similarly
to influence political decisions. See Francisco Toro, Venezuela’s Democracy is Fake, But
the Government’s Latest Election Win was Real, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/10/17/venezuelasdemocracy-is-fake-but-the-governments-latest-election-win-was-real/
19
20
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rights of liberty, free choice, and government-mandated
entitlements all conditioned on “voluntarily” allowing the
government to access personal biometric and demographic
information.29
Not only is the voluntary nature of the program an advertising
farce for those who rely on government benefits, but the information
is authenticated by private corporations where data leaks are
common.30 For example, in a test run by The Tribune, a reporter
texted a WhatsApp number with his name, email address, and a
money transfer of only 500 rupees ($7 USD).31 Within ten minutes,
he was emailed back by the hacker with an “Enrolment Agency
Administrator ID” and password, giving him access to the Aadhaar
site and “details of every Indian citizen registered”—including bank
account and entitlement information.32 Additionally, a high-ranking
Aadhaar official, R.S. Sharma, dared “ethical hackers” on Twitter
to hack his account, claiming that Aadhaar was so safe that it would
be unsuccessful.33 The hackers accepted the challenge and, within
minutes, his personal information was released, including his
address, Aadhaar ID number, phone number, frequent flyer
identification, and, to prove that the system was completely
penetrable, the hackers deposited a single rupee into his bank
account.34
When the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other
Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act was passed in 2016,35 the
Indian Supreme Court was left with the task of determining whether

[https://perma.cc/Y8JK-7UR2].
29 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 54.
30 Id.
31 Rachna Khaira, Rs 500, 10 Minutes, and You Have Access to Billion Aadhaar
Details, TRIBUNE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html
[https://perma.cc/MF5C-2RSF].
32 Id.
33 Rachel Chitra, Hackers Deposit Re 1 in Trai Chief’s Account, TIMES INDIA (July
30, 2018), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/hackers-deposit-re-1-in-trai-chiefsaccount/articleshow/65190556.cms [https://perma.cc/Z8T9-UJU4].
34 Id.
35 The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits and
Services) Act, 2016, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India) [hereinafter The Aadhaar
Act].
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the Aadhaar system was constitutionally valid.36 On September 26,
2018, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Aadhaar.37 The Court focused extensively on the Right to Privacy,
memorialized in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.38
Specifically, Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, mirroring
the United States’ Declaration of Independence.39 Privacy is within
“personal liberty,” and the Court included “informational privacy,
and privacy of choice” within the privacy protections.40 The Court
went on to hold that Aadhaar gives Indians a privacy of choice
through “universal proof of identity” throughout India.41 The
biometric system protects citizens’ identities from fraud and illegal
activities.42 Additionally, citizens have an opportunity to travel
anywhere throughout the country without needing extensive
documentation.43 In the Court’s interpretation, Aadhaar is a way for
all citizens to be counted as a part of society.44 The most
marginalized now receive the benefits “which are actually meant for
[them],” no matter where they are in India.45
The Court discussed the administrative problems likely to arise
during the initial Aadhaar implementation,46 including: no access to
an Aadhaar ID card because the mail backup takes so long that many
addresses change before the card and information are received;47
limited or intermittent internet access that prevents citizens, whose
Id.
See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 3–4 (India).
38 Id. at 19. See also Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 9 SCC 1 (2017) (India)
(determining that the Right to Privacy is a fundamental right that cannot be taken away
without the existence of a law that is a legitimate State interest, and the law should pass
the test of proportionality. The Supreme Court used Shayara Bano to set the stage for
holding that data privacy is included in the “Right to Privacy.”).
39 See INDIA CONST. art. 21.
40 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 164 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 14.
42 Ayyar, supra note12.
43 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 164.
44 Id. at 196–97.
45 Id. at 85.
46 See Ayyar, supra note 12 (noting that some administrative challenges led people
to return several days in a row to receive rations because of poor internet connection).
47 Kritika Roy, Revisiting Aadhaar System: Post the Supreme Court Verdict,
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES AND ANALYSES (Nov.
2,
2018),
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/revisiting-aadhaar-system-kroy-021018
[https://perma.cc/7LN4-VYGB].
36
37
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biometric data was not input into the offline version, from receiving
assistance;48 and lack of access for the old and young—faded
fingerprints and cloudy irises prevent biometric matches with some
over 60 years old, and children’s fingerprints change as they grow
older.49 However, despite these administrative issues, the Modi
Court ruled the positives of Aadhaar far outweighed its
weaknesses.50
III. A Data Privacy Survey

Historically in the United States, privacy was seen as “the right
to be let alone.”51 This definition was accepted globally, and it has
been expanded as countries adapt to changing technologies. More
recently, the Supreme Court of the United States defined privacy as
“the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person.”52 However, the extent of individual privacy rights depends
on the region of the world. To help compare India’s individual data
privacy rights with other nations, I have created a data privacy
spectrum, on which I have placed four countries’ systems: the EU,
the United States, Malaysia, and China. These four countries or
systems were chosen for their comparative value. The countries are
placed on the spectrum based on the data privacy protections they
provide: the EU would lie on one end, providing strict individual
protections,53 and the United States would fall somewhere in the
middle of the spectrum.54 On the far end of the spectrum would lie
48 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 370 (citing Professor Reetika Khera that the system is
“wholly inappropriate technology for rural India”).
49 Ayyar, supra note 12 (warning that if a person’s biometric verification is denied
for any reason, they are denied rations); see also Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 313 (noting that
authentication failures were as high as 49% in 2016).
50 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 313.
51 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 (1980).
52 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
53 GDPR, supra note 5. See also Case C–131/12, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
54 While the United States is mostly state-driven in the field of data privacy, federal
regulations include The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
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both Malaysia’s MyKad system55 and China’s Social Credit System,
which offer very few individual data protections.56
Like the United States,57 India does not yet have a single federal
data protection law, but instead takes a sectoral approach.58 The
minimal protections that individual Indian citizens do have are
limited “sensitive personal information.”59 Even this information
only protects against corporate businesses that automatically
process consumer data.60 The protections still do not allow
individuals to control their own data.61 The Aadhaar Act allows the
Indian government to compile all sensitive personal data in a
centralized database that it can use without individual consent.62
Thus, the Aadhaar Act creates a question about how much India
values individual privacy rights. It is necessary to address this
question because technology is constantly changing, companies are
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), The Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), among others. See Nancy Perkins et al., California’s
New Privacy Statute: Is It a US GDPR?, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 3, 2018)
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/10/californias-newprivacystatute?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=ViewOriginal [https://perma.cc/5WNY-JL43]; Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., US States Pass Data
Protection Laws on the Heels of the GDPR, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (July 9, 2018),
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/07/u-s-states-pass-data-protection-laws-onthe-heels-of-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ9-BFQG] (demonstrating that some states are
using the GDPR as a role model for their own systems).
55 Introduction to MyKad, NATIONAL REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY
OF HOME AFFAIRS, https://www.jpn.gov.my/en/informasimykad/introduction-to-mykad/
[https://perma.cc/W5U9-JB89].
56 Outline of the Construction of Social Credit System (2014-2020), CREDIT CHINA,
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/redian/zhengcefagui/201711/t20171122_9
6782.html [https://perma.cc/UX3U-BCBJ] [hereinafter Social Credit System].
57 See infra, Part II(b).
58 Data Protection Regulations and International Data Flows: Implications for
Trade and Development, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD) 44 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
59 Id.
60 Id. See also Vindu Goel, India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/technology/india-internetcensorship.html?utm_campaign=The%20Interface&utm_medium=email&utm_source=R
evue%20newsletter [https://perma.cc/JSD4-ZWMD].
61 UNCTAD, supra note 58.
62 Id. See also The Aadhaar Act, supra note 35.
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becoming more reliant on consumer data, and therefore, personal
data privacy is increasingly at risk. Technology changes much
faster than laws and regulations, so the government must react
quickly to the changing technological landscape to ensure
individuals can safely and securely benefit from its advancements.
A. European Union

The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is based on
the belief that “personal data is a fundamental right,” established
through the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union63
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”).64 The GDPR presumes that “[n]atural persons should
have control of their own personal data[,]” even in a technologyfocused world where personal information is often publicly
available and incredibly valuable.65 The protections are very
broad—regulating the processing of personal data by an individual,
a company, or an organization in the EU.66 Personal data is also
defined in broad terms as “any information” that, when collected
together, could lead to an individual being identified,67 including
data that has been de-identified or encrypted through
“pseudonymization,” but could still be used to identify a person
when put together with other information.68 It forces all public data
to be anonymized through an irreversible process.69
Additionally, the GDPR restricts any means of processing data
in the public sphere, without freely-given consent by the individual
in an effort to ensure the information collected is limited to what is
necessary, accurate, secure, and not stored for longer than is
63 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364/01) Art. 8(1).
64 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C
326/10).
65 GDPR, supra note 5, at recital 7.
66 See id. arts. 1–2.
67 Id. art. 4(1).
68 Id. art. 26.
69 Id.
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necessary.70 It covers all international companies doing business in
the EU that process data—whether automated or non-automated.71
In particular, the GDPR goes further than other regulations in the
rights given to the data subject. Article 14 allows the data subject
to receive information regarding his or her collected personal data,72
Article 15 allows the subject to access the data,73 and Article 16
allows the data subject to rectify any inaccurate personal data
“without undue delay.”74 Finally, Section 3, Article 17, “Right to
Erasure (‘right to be forgotten’),” allows the data subject to erase
certain personal information “without undue delay.”75 If the
personal data is no longer necessary, consent is withdrawn by the
subject, the data was unlawfully processed, or when the subject is a
minor and his or her guardians did not provide consent, the data
must be erased immediately upon request.76 The GDPR places a
high value on an individual’s personal data, allowing each
individual substantial freedom to control what information can be
processed and when that data must then be erased.
Technology companies that rely on consumer data information
have been forced to adapt in the EU. Consent must be “freely given,
specific, informed, and unambiguous.”77 As one GDPR expert has
termed, this has led to a new era of “beg data.”78 “Freely given”
means that the data must be “truly optional.”79 “Specific” means
that companies now must state exactly for what purpose they will
Id. arts. 4–5 (noting that the GDPR does not apply in the private sphere).
What
Constitutes
Data
Processing,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/what-constitutes-dataprocessing_en [https://perma.cc/K6ZD-6RXA] (defining processing as the “collection,
recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaption or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment
or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction of personal data”).
72 GDPR, supra note 5, art. 14 (“Information to be provided where personal data
have not been obtained from the data subject”).
73 Id. art. 15 (“Right of access by the data subject”).
74 Id. art. 16 (“Right to rectification”).
75 Id. art. 17, sec. 3 (Right to Erasure (“right to be forgotten”)).
76 Id. (listing five exceptions to when personal data cannot be erased).
77 GDPR, supra note 5, art. 4.
78 Tim Walters, Welcome To the Era of “Beg Data,” LINKEDIN (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/welcome-era-beg-data-tim-walters-ph-d-/
[https://perma.cc/R2NN-2RLM].
79 Consent,
GDPR
EU,
https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/keyconcepts/consent/ [https://perma.cc/P48Q-N5ZG].
70
71
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use each piece of data.80 Information collected can only be gathered
for the purpose that is specifically laid out to the consumer.81
“Informed” means that the company must use plain language that is
unambiguous.82 In other words, affirmative action such as checking
an “accept” box must be taken; silence is not an option.83 Therefore,
companies must adjust to the new requirements and change how
they collect and use data. They can no longer use any data for any
purpose, but they must have a plan in place as to how they will
collect and use consumer data. Spending has increased in order to
navigate the GDPR and to comply with its restrictions. The GDPR
proves that, through increased regulation, giant corporations can be
tamed and the “data wild west” can be civilized.
B. United States

Similar regulations of individual data privacy do not exist in the
federal system of the United States, placing the United States’
system towards the middle of a data privacy spectrum.84 The United
States does not have any “centralized, formal legislation at the
federal level;” instead, it follows a “sectoral approach” that relies
on a combination of state-enacted regulations and self-regulation by
businesses.85 Federal statutes that do exist are aimed at specific

Id.
Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Data Protection Law, LEGAL RESOURCES, https://www.hg.org/dataprotection.html [https://perma.cc/F38J-TTY6].
85 Id. However, as noted in Social Media Hearing, supra note 1, Facebook and other
technology companies are not quick to self-regulate. See also Mike Isaac, Why Everyone
Is Angry at Facebook Over Its Political Ads Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/technology/campaigns-pressure-facebookpolitical-ads.html [https://perma.cc/ZN72-KW6R] (noting that Facebook will not factcheck political ads, but after lots of internal pressure, Google has decided to fact-check
political ads). In general, when businesses are left to self-regulate, they are slow and often
have a financial incentive, so it is unsettling to think that individual data privacy will be
left for businesses to self-regulate under the current system in the United States.
80
81
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sectors of the economy, and do not have the breadth of the GDPR.86
Also contrary to the GDPR, the United States’ hands-off approach
allows the private sector to lead the way in data protection,
encouraging individuals to self-regulate which companies and
electronic sources have access to their personal information, and to
what extent.87
Unlike the EU, which considers data privacy a guaranteed
“fundamental” human right, the United States Constitution does not
explicitly enumerate privacy as a fundamental right.88 While
privacy is implied in the penumbras of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has never held that data privacy is included as a
fundamentally protected Constitutional right.89 Several states have
enacted legislation mirroring the protections of the GDPR in an
effort to provide their constituents with greater transparency,
notifications, and control over their data, but no federal legislation
has been enacted.90 The results yield great confusion over when
protections must be afforded, and more money spent by companies
to determine when and how privacy must be protected.91 In fact,
over 25% of U.S. companies have spent over $1 million since 2018
to ensure compliance with the GDPR—if they have businesses
abroad—and state privacy protections, and 10% of companies have
been forced to spend above $2.5 million.92
While most of these states have only enacted “breach
86 Data Protection 2018: USA, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES (Dec.
6,
2018),
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/usa
[https://perma.cc/NR7H-CAU6]. For example, federal laws protecting data privacy in the
healthcare industry include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”). The Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) regulates credit information and credit reports. Minors’
data is specifically protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”) and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).
87 Id.
88 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
89 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
90 ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44326, DATA SECURITY AND
BREACH NOTIFICATION LEGISLATION: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2015) (noting specifically
California leading the way with the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018).
91 Michael Becker, GDPR Compliance: How It’s Affecting U.S. Companies,
EMARSYS,
https://www.emarsys.com/resources/blog/gdpr-united-states-companies/
[https://perma.cc/CUN2-2NXE] (noting the increased spending to ensure compliance with
the state-specific data privacy laws and regulations).
92 Id.
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notification laws” that require businesses to alert their consumers
when any personal information is compromised,93 California has
gone further by enacting the California Consumer Privacy Act of
2018 (“CCPA”).94 The CCPA resembles the GDPR because it:
applies to domestic and international companies doing business in
California; expands what qualifies as personal information;
mandates disclosure to consumers regarding use of personal
information; allows consumers to access information that details
how their information is being used; prohibits businesses from
changing how they treat consumers based on whether or what data
they consent to share; and permits consumers to opt-out of sharing
their data which, at times, must be completely erased.95
Specifically, the CCPA restricts access to sensitive data without
consent, and selling and sharing personal information like email
addresses and telephone numbers.96
The CCPA was passed in response to massive breaches of
personal information and, while not all fifty states have a breach
notification law in place, other states may soon follow California’s
lead.97 Further, with the recent congressional hearings involving
social media sites,98 it is possible that Congress could enact more
sweeping data privacy legislation. For now, the United States’
passive, piecemeal approach to regulation is not as protective as the
GDPR, but it affords some moderate protections.

93 Serrato et al., supra note 54. See also Volodzko, supra note 2 (demonstrating the
breach exposed more than half a billion guests and Marriott was required to report to
consumers that their information was compromised).
94 Spencer Persson et al., California Passes Major Legislation, Expanding Consumer
Privacy Rights and Legal Exposure for US and Global Companies, NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT (June 29, 2018), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/06/californiapasses-major-privacy-legislation-expanding-consumer-privacy-rights/
[https://perma.cc/MNJ2-CFNW].
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. See also Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection
and
Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Jan.
30,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection
[https://perma.cc/88U2-4NUC] (reporting that data breaches at Equifax in 2017, Yahoo,
and Deep Root Analytics’ “accidental leak” paved the way for many of the state-enacted
data breach laws).
98 Social Media Hearing, supra note 1.
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C. Malaysia

On the other side of the data privacy spectrum—opposite the
EU—are Malaysia and China. Malaysia was the first country to
develop a Government Multi-Purpose Smart Card (MyKad)—
similar to the Aadhaar Card in India—that incorporates services
from various sectors of the government into a single card.99 The
card stores biographical information100 and fingerprints.101 The
government’s main uses for the MyKad card in 2018 were to
confirm identities, births, and deaths, but the card has many more
functions as well.102 MyKad is used for email, e-banking, online
transactions, electronic public services, business licenses, overseas
travel, and other services, including highway tolls, public
transportation, and even theme parks.103 Separate cards are issued
to children, immigrants, and temporary residents.104
There is little doubt among Malaysians that MyKad’s ability to
put all documents on a single card provides convenience, but having
to carry an identity card everywhere—that identifies a person’s
immutable characteristics, including demographic and biographic
information, health records, banking links, public transportation
records, and digital identification mechanisms—is often associated
with authoritarian regimes.105 It is easy to conjure up many
Introduction to MyKad, supra note 55.
See id. The biographical information includes: Name, Address, Race, Citizenship
Status, Religion, Marital Status, Criminal Record, and Fingerprint Minutiae. The type of
biographical information, especially Race, Citizenship Status, and Religion separates
MyKad users into groups based on personal immutable characteristics. Other biographical
information includes “[b]asic health information such as blood type, allergies, organ
implants, chronic diseases and information on beneficiary.” Id.
101 Id.
102 Statistics for Year 2018, NATIONAL REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY
OF HOME AFFAIRS, https://www.jpn.gov.my/en/statistic-2018/ [https://perma.cc/U5TGF9SV].
103 Introduction to MyKad, supra note 55.
104 See id. (MyKID is for children; MyPR is for permanent residents; and MyKAS is
for temporary residents).
105 Kuthubul Zaman Bukhari, MYKAD & Privacy Rights, THE MALAYSIAN BAR (Apr.
2,
2004),
99

100
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instances in which a person’s personal data can be used by a third
party.106 Now, with MyKad, all of that information is on a single
card, where the chip can be “read,” “recorded,” and sold to third
parties.107
In 2013, Malaysians received some limited protections through
the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (“PDPA”).108 However, the
PDPA only prevents the misuse of personal data in commercial
transactions, including “matters relating to the supply or exchange
of goods or services, agency, investments, financing, banking and
insurance.”109 It does not apply to the federal or state governments,
leaving open the threat of malfeasance by the government.110 “Big
Brother” still has access to the data, without regulations because
Malaysia does not have the protections like the GDPR.111 There is
no right of rectification if data is incorrect, no right to view that
information, no right to consent to what information is made
available, no restrictions on sale of data, and no right to be
forgotten.112 Simply, the PDPA protections are weak.
When he was asked about the lack of individual privacy, the
MyKad project director simply stated that the personal information
on a MyKad card “is no big deal and doesn’t compromise your
privacy in any way . . . military people have always carried a special
ID and in no way has it impeded their freedom.”113 Recently,
Human Resources Minister M. Kulasegaran recognized the security
issues faced by the MyKad card, especially involving personal
information, and stated he is “keen to update [the] MyKad

http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=989
[https://perma.cc/GB76-Y9XW].
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See generally Personal Data Protection Act, June 10, 2010, Act 709 (Malaysia)
(noting some small protections to personal data such as in automatic commercial business
transactions).
109 Muhammad Hafiz Mohd Shukri, The Privacy and Security of an Identification
Card: Malaysian Perspective, MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE 7 (July 30, 2015).
110 Id.
111 See Mathews Thomas, Is Malaysia’s MyKad the ‘One Card to Rule Them All’?
The Urgent Need to Develop a Proper Legal Framework for the Protection of Personal
Information in Malaysia, 28(2) MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 474, 484–91 (2004).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 491 (quoting Wan Mohamad Ariffin Wan Ismail, MyKad project director)
(emphasis in original).
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identification card system with something similar to India’s
sophisticated Aadhaar model that uses unique random 12-digit
numbers.”114 Even India’s card, which this Article critiques for its
few protections, affords more protections to Indian citizens than the
MyKad card because MyKad does not even have minimal security
protections from hackers, thieves, and third party data buyers. For
now, without many security and privacy protections in place,
Malaysia places more emphasis on government surveillance than it
does on protecting an individual’s data privacy.
D. China

A financial credit score is a common function in the United
States that rates a person’s financial trustworthiness to give
investors an indication of risk, such as how likely repayment will be
and at what rate the interest will be set. China is using “high-tech
and big data”115 to create a “social credit scoring system” that, much
like its financial cousin, will rate your social trustworthiness and
your risk to the government.116 The Chinese system uses personal
consumer data to gauge how likely an individual is to engage in
unlawful activity and determines what social advantages they will
have, including shorter hospital lines, better travel deals, and rental
discounts.117 Individuals with a lower social credit score may be
restricted from buying luxury items, train and airline tickets, or an
apartment, and they may be blocked from dating sites, or their
children may be blocked from attending the best schools.118 When
the Chinese government glimpses that an individual buys diapers or
114 Zurairi AR, Minister: Malaysia Eager to Swap MyKad with India’s Aadhaar
Biometric
ID
System,
MALAYMAIL
(Oct.
15,
2018),
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/10/15/minister-malaysia-eager-toswap-mykad-with-indias-aadhar-biometric-id-syste/1682938
[https://perma.cc/56VJFFYH].
115 See
What
Is
Big
Data?,
BERNARD
MARR,
https://www.bernardmarr.com/default.asp?contentID=766
[https://perma.cc/XWS3LHHX] (“The term ‘Big Data’ refers to the collection of all [internet, machine, human,
and smart] data and our ability to use it to our advantage across a wide range of areas.”).
116 Marr, supra note 6.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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plays video games without using cheat codes, his credit score goes
up; however, if he purchases alcohol or plays video games for most
of the day, his social credit score may suffer.119 Even the choice of
online friends and one’s community reputation will be a factor.120
The data used in compiling a social credit score comes from
many sources, including basic personal information, financial
records, health records, and all digital communication.121 From the
cookies in online sites to the information entered on company
websites, the Chinese government is constantly watching and
monitoring its citizens. The system tracks social media, voting
records, legal issues, criminal history, tax history, financial history,
health-tracking applications, GPS applications, personal
relationships with family and friends, and uses facial recognition
software to constantly track movements.122
China views the social credit system as a way to utilize the
readily available big data and artificial intelligence (“A.I.”)
algorithms to “lead [China] to a new era in upstanding citizenry.”123
While online data in the United States is “curated, collected,
monetized and sliced and diced in all sorts of ways,” it is through
the private sector, not through big government, and has little relation
to individuals’ interactions with other sectors of the economy.124
For China, the social credit system is an integral part of the “socialist
market economic system . . . [to] promote the tradition of
integrity . . . [and] improve the integrity and credit level of the
whole society.”125 China is attempting to reform the economic
system, achieve scientific development, accelerate social
transformation, and expand globalization efforts, and it sees the

Id.
Luke Dormehl, We’re Closer to China’s Disturbing ‘Social Credit System’ Than
you Realize, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cooltech/social-credit-system/ [https://perma.cc/699K-MJRN].
121 Social Credit System, supra note 56.
122 Audrey Murrell, Pushing the Ethical Boundaries of Big Data: A Look at China’s
Social
Credit
Scoring
System,
FORBES
(July
31,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/audreymurrell/2018/07/31/pushing-the-ethical-boundariesof-big-data-a-look-at-chinas-social-credit-scoring-system/#2ec7305525e5
[https://perma.cc/766F-A5QE].
123 Dormehl, supra note 120.
124 See id. (noting that Facebook and other social media giants have algorithms
designed to filter out certain ideas, so an individual is left in “filter bubble”).
125 Social Credit System, supra note 56.
119
120
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social credit system as the way to develop the guiding ideology and
principles that will be vital to its future development.126 Much like
Aadhaar, the government believes that the personal data gained
from companies through technological advances will create ease in
everyday tasks and allow for even greater wealth.
Critics of the social credit system describe big data as a
nightmare, because citizens’ lives will soon, if not already, revolve
around their social credit worthiness, and they have no control over
the information.127 Critics also point to hacking concerns; however,
when stories of hacking are raised, they are immediately deleted,
and the dissenting whistleblowers quickly receive a negative change
in their credit score.128 “Big Brother” is in control over every facet
of a Chinese citizen’s life, and there is no individual say in what
personal information is used by the government.129 China’s use of
big data to restrict data privacy puts China on the opposite end of
the data privacy spectrum from the EU.
IV. Placing India on the Data Privacy Spectrum

While most Western democracies have opposed any databases
where personal individual information, including biometric data, is
centralized, India has designed Aadhaar to use personal, sensitive,
“big data” to “cut out the middleman, eradicate corruption and to
ensure that subsidized goods and services reach the deserving
recipients.”130 While Aadhaar is not that similar to the Social Credit
Id.
Marr, supra note 6.
128 See John Koetsier, Hacking China’s Social Credit: Cheaters Claim Million in
Cash, Instant Promotions, and Preferential Dating, MEDIUM (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://medium.com/@johnkoetsier/hacking-chinas-social-credit-cheaters-claimmillions-in-cash-instant-promotions-and-87ad89ed5c6f [https://perma.cc/N9W5-3KHU]
(noting a black market has been created where citizens pay cash to get their credit score
raised).
129 Marr, supra note 6.
130 Jayesh Shinde, How Does Aadhaar Compare with Other ID Systems in the World
& How to Secure its Leaky Database, INDIA TIMES LIFESTYLE NETWORK (July 19, 2019),
https://www.indiatimes.com/technology/news/how-does-aadhaar-compare-with-other-idsystems-in-the-world-how-to-secure-its-leaky-database-276972.html
126
127

2020

INDIA'S DATA WILD WEST

637

System, it raises many of the same data privacy concerns as the
MyKad system,131 placing India closer to Malaysia on a data privacy
spectrum. First, Aadhaar, like MyKad, is designed for services
across all sectors: from a welfare distribution system, to email, ebanking, and even social media.132 Aadhaar provides easy access to
a wide range of services.133 However, needing to carry an
identification card for everyday affairs is like carrying one’s health
records, public transportation records, banking information, and
more sensitive information everywhere one goes.134 This need for
constant identification is often associated with authoritarian
ideals.135 Second, there is no protection against abuse by “Big
Brother.”136 Like MyKad, the few data protections that do exist
currently only apply to the use of sensitive information by private
sector businesses.137 Similarly, there is no right to consent to what
information is made available.138 While it is not yet mandatory to
carry the Aadhaar card as proof of identity for Indian citizens,139 an
Aadhaar identity is becoming increasingly necessary for success in
society.140 India has not yet reached the point of GDPR-like
protections.
The GDPR is the gold standard that countries should strive to
[https://perma.cc/D5CZ-7MB8].
131 See id.
132 See, e.g., R. Dinakaran, Skype Lite Integrated with Aadhaar, HINDU BUS. LINE
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/skype-lite-integratedwith-aadhaar/article9750022.ece [https://perma.cc/JE63-98LN].
133 Id.
134 Ayyar, supra note 12.
135 See id. This would be comparable to the United States requiring a driver’s license
that also includes health records, banking information, social security and passport
numbers, immigration status, religious information, and more. It is easy to see how this
type of information might be used by authoritarian regimes.
136 Id.
137 The Aadhaar Act, supra note 35.
138 See id. (There is no right to consent to what information is made available, and no
right to be forgotten).
139 See Shinde, supra note 130 (explaining it is unlikely that India will take this step).
140 Priscilla Jebaraj, The Aadhaar Holdouts: Living Life Without UID, THE WIRE
(June
2,
2017)
https://thewire.in/tech/the-aadhaar-holdouts-profile
[https://perma.cc/ZNK6-RL85] Th article shows instances where those without Aadhaar
are being stranded by the government. Some instances include, not getting relief under
the “Bonded Labour System Act,” not securing government subsidies, and not being able
to enroll a child in school.

638

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

achieve,141 but the Aadhaar program conflicts with the goals of the
international community. The Constitution of India protects
“informational privacy,”142 and assumes that Aadhaar protects
informational privacy because of its fraud prevention measures.143
Yet, no Indian law indoctrinates personal data privacy as a
fundamental right, like the GDPR does.144 Additionally, Aadhaar
information is anonymized, but the process is reversible, as
evidenced by the numerous data breaches.145 Increasingly more
sensitive information is included in the Aadhaar database, and more
private companies require Aadhaar information as a way to check
individual security.146 Private companies profit on this information,
without fully securing the information, which puts millions of
citizens at risk.147
The global trend in democratic countries is to give more
protections to individual data privacy;148 however, India’s Aadhaar
system contradicts this trend by, instead, keeping India locked into
the perception of being more like the state-restrictive system in
Malaysia. India certainly does not come near China in terms of the
restrictions on individual data privacy, but it must make certain to
advance away from the surveillance state of its north-western
neighbors. Aadhaar has not yet begun to influence social behavior
by rewarding compliance and punishing those with social
disadvantages, but the Aadhaar system does interact with other
sectors of the economy.149 The goals of the Aadhaar system and
China’s Social Credit System also align—both governments cite
their respective systems being vital to future development.150 The
ease of providing services to citizens and the ability to know what
141
142

See generally, UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 32–34 (discussing the GDPR).
Constitution of India, art. 21. See also Puttaswamy, Writ Petition No. 494 of 2012,

at 164.
143 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364/01) Art. 8(1).
144 Id.
145 See Khaira, supra note 31.
146 See Jebaraj, supra note 140 (explaining that “private micro-payment systems,
airline and telecom companies, and more are demanding Aadhaar information to ascertain
your identity”).
147 See Khaira, supra note 31.
148 See GDPR, supra note 5; Perkins, supra note 54; Serrato et al., supra note 54.
149 Dormehl, supra note 120.
150 See Social Credit System, supra note 56; see also Ayyar, supra note 12.
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citizens need are the underpinnings of each system.151 The Aadhaar
system is not as intrusive as the Social Credit System; however,
India must take active steps to avoid the possible abusive behavior
by bad actors who may use the Aadhaar system to open the door to
data privacy exploitation, as seen in China today. Luckily, India’s
government has recognized many of the issues with Aadhaar and
has proposed steps to secure individual data.
A. Steps by India’s Legislature: “A Free and Fair Digital
Economy: Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians”
India’s legislature seems to have already recognized some
potential problems, and is in the process of taking concrete steps to
solve its data privacy issues by borrowing many ideas from the
GDPR.152 The government appointed former Indian Supreme Court
Justice, BN Srikrishna, to chair the Committee of Experts on a Data
Protection Framework for India (“Committee”) to “create the legal
framework for data protection and data privacy in India.”153 The
race for individual data in the wild west of big data is much like the
gold rush, and the Committee has sought to secure these data
privacy rights for the Indian citizens before data is no longer private.
The Committee released a proposed 200-page-plus bill to the
legislature in July 2018.154 It recognized the benefits of big data on
India’s citizens, including the ease, range, and affordability of
services that could be provided one day.155 However, the

See Social Credit System, supra note 56; see also Ayyar, supra note 12.
152 Sindhuja Balaji, India Finally has a Data Privacy Framework—What Does it
Mean for its Billion-Dollar Tech Industry?, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sindhujabalaji/2018/08/03/india-finally-has-a-data-privacyframework-what-does-it-mean-for-its-billion-dollar-tech-industry/#6baf4d6870fe
[https://perma.cc/LE2M-GTSW].
153 Shushant Jha, The Personal Data Protection Landscape in Developing Countries,
IBM CLOUD BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/bluemix/2019/01/indiasjourney-to-personal-data-protection-and-data-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/M64TLQCA].
154 Srikrishna, supra note 8. The proposed bill has since been tabled for the time
being.
155 See generally id. at 98–106 (outlining a few benefits from the Aadhaar system).
See also Arghya Sengupta, A Free & Fair Digital Economy: Draft Data Protection Bill
Asserts Our Sovereignty and Safeguards Citizens’ Interests, TIMES OF INDIA (July 30,
2018),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/a-free-fair-digitaleconomy-draft-data-protection-bill-asserts-our-sovereignty-and-safeguards-citizensinterests/ [https://perma.cc/85JA-9HUG] (breaking down the intricacies of the 200-page
151
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Committee cautioned that the harms associated with using big data
include unexpected data sharing, tracking online behavior—
including on intimate matters—and breaches of privacy.156 The
premise of the report is based on the Aadhaar case, Puttaswamy v.
Union of India, and the holding that individual privacy is a
fundamental right, but allowing the Aadhaar system to continue
cautiously.157
There are four primary actions that the Committee
recommended. First, the entity that seeks an individual’s data is
given a fiduciary role which, much like the GDPR, demands the
entity respect the data entrusted to it.158 This allows data subjects to
hold the third-party liable if their data is misused in any way, and
requires that data subjects be notified if their data is breached or
used without permission.159 Second, entities can only collect the
information that is necessary to the service that the company
provides.160 For example, Facebook cannot collect healthcare
information because that is not necessary to the social media service
that it provides, but it could collect—with permission—data relating
to internet cookies that could be used to improve their services.161
Third, the committee recommended establishing a Data Protection
Authority (“DPA”) to adjudicate data privacy claims and both
penalize entities and award damages to individuals.162 The bill
would prevent all “sensitive data” from being stored in a central
facility; instead, the bill mandates that all personal, sensitive data be
locally stored, restricting Big-Brother-type-data-use.163 Finally, like
the GDPR, the Committee recommends limited instances of data
erasure.164 However, unlike the EU’s “Right to be Forgotten,” the
Committee only recommended the right of erasure when using
personal data becomes “unlawful or unwarranted” because “the

report).
Id.
See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 164 (India).
158 See Srikrishna, supra note 8, at 49–67.
159 Id. at 67.
160 See id. at 35 (For instance, a ride-sharing app would not generally be able to access
my text message data.).
161 See id.
162 Id. at 166.
163 Id. at 97.
164 Srikrishna, supra note 8, at 75.
156
157
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right to privacy [must] be balanced with the freedom of speech.”165
Specifically related to the Aadhaar Act, the Committee
recognized the large impact on informational privacy.166 It strongly
advocated for immediate changes to protect against “companies
wrongly insisting on Aadhaar numbers, [] using Aadhaar numbers
for unauthorised purposes and [] leaking Aadhaar numbers.”167 The
Committee recommended two major solutions to this problem.
First, the Aadhaar Act must be amended to set up two groups of
entities—those allowed to access Aadhaar information online and
those restricted to verifying identities offline only—in an attempt to
prevent Aadhaar data breaches.168 The legislature must decide on a
limited group of entities, central to national interests that have
access to the online identification, but the Committee recommended
that private companies be completely excluded, relying exclusively
on verifying identities offline.169
Second, since over 1.3 billion people have Aadhaar cards, and
many services require Aadhaar identification, the legislature must
create a regulatory framework that includes the ability for the DPA
to hear and enforce complaints regarding the misuse of data.170 The
Aadhaar number should be added to the list of “sensitive personal
data,” to prevent private entities from storing that information and
to prevent foreign companies from accessing that information.171
The second part of this recommendation is of particular importance.
If a company wants to process Aadhaar data for security checks, or
if a company wants to store any general, non-sensitive information,
it must set up a physical location in India.172 For example,
Facebook, to store any general information, even if it is not
sensitive, would have to set up a physical location in India to store
the Indian citizen’s data.173 Facebook would not be able to store
Indian data in the United States or elsewhere.
The Committee’s proposed legislation would increase the data
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 76.
Id. at 99
Id.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 100.
Srikrishna, supra note 8, at 100.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 97.
See id.
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security of the Aadhaar program, compartmentalize the
information, and increase the regulatory framework. While the
changes would likely decrease data breaches, it does not sufficiently
address data privacy concerns—what information can be accessed
by private entities and what restrictions exist on the central
government’s access.
V. Conclusion
Implementing the Committee’s recommendations would
significantly improve India’s protection of individual data privacy.
The proposed legislation reflects much of what the GDPR regulates:
citizens must consent to information being shared, personal
information cannot leave the country without certain precautions,
and individuals have a right to legal action when personal data is
misused.174 However, while the Committee recognized a right to be
forgotten, its proposal limits when information may be erased by
balancing the right of erasure against competing rights and interests,
including freedom of speech.175 The individual must formally
request erasure through the DPA adjudication process, and erasure
must only be performed when it is absolutely necessary to protect
the individual.176 Additionally, the Committee’s data breach
proposal does not go far enough in protecting the privacy of its
citizens.177
While the Aadhaar system has and will continue to provide
citizens with immense benefits, there needs to be increased
regulation with regard to how the system protects data privacy. The
proposed legislation by the Committee is a start, but there are many
questions that remain unanswered and a lot of work that must be
done.
One issue that has jumped to the forefront of Aadhaar is how the
act will interact with the Citizenship Amendment Act (“CAA”).178
The CAA permits religiously prosecuted “Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist,
Jain, Parsi or Christian [persons] from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or

174 See generally GDPR, supra note 5. More detailed discussion is contained in the
discussion of the GDPR in Part II(a).
175 Srikrishna, supra note 8, at 77–80.
176 Id.
177 See id. at 62–67 (discussing the recommendations of data breach laws).
178
The Citizenship Act, 1955, No. 57 of 1955, § 14A, as amended by The
Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, INDIA CODE (2019).
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Pakistan. . .” to receive protections in India.179 These minority
groups will not be treated as illegal immigrants and the
naturalization requirement is reduced from eleven to five years of
residency.180 The Act excludes Muslims from protection, further
separating religious communities by further splitting the country
into Hindu vs Muslim.181 Some Muslim residents, who have lived
in India for multiple generations, are denied the benefits of an
Aadhaar card because their birth certificates do not denote Indian
genealogy.182 President Modi, who campaigned against big
government and government interference, has increased data
surveillance, in part through Aadhaar. While the Supreme Court
stated that “[t]he Aadhaar number . . . shall not, by itself, confer any
right of, or be proof of, citizenship or domicile in respect of an
Aadhaar number holder[,]”183 the CAA designates the Aadhaar card
as one way to prove citizenship.184 Data privacy protections grow
more important as the reach of the Aadhaar system is used as a tool
for religious discrimination.
Additionally, the proposed regulations should go further to
guarantee more data that can be erased, increase opportunities to
consent to data, limit private sector access to prevent against
security breaches, and apply strict limits to data access and use by
the central government. India’s constitution values privacy as a
fundamental right, so data privacy should be protected as such.
There is a push and pull between the proposed legislation and
Aadhaar and currently, the legislation has been tabled by the Indian
Parliament. If India truly desires to “shape the global digital
landscape of the 21st century, it must formulate a legal framework
relating to personal data that can work as a template for the
developing world.”185 As the world of technology continues to

179

Id. at § 2.
Id.
181
See Sagarika Ghose, CAA, Aadhaar or data bill: In India, it is state vs citizen, THE
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grow, India has the ability to lead the revolution. India must
institute protections so that Aadhaar can be beneficial while also
upholding its citizens’ fundamental right of privacy.

